MOULTRIE ET AL. vs. HUNT.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

In the N'rew York Court of Appeals.
MOULTRIE ET AL. V8. HUNT.
1. In executing a will of personal property, the testator must observe the formalities required by the law of his domicil, and not those of the place where the will
is made. The maxim "locus regit actum" has no place in English or American
testamentary jurisprudence. This principle is universally true when the domicil
continues to the time of the testator's death.
2. If the testator, after executing the will, changes his domicil and resides under
another jurisdiction at his death, the formalities required by the new domicil
must have been observed, or the will is void.
3. A will is an inchoate and provisional transaction until the testator's death, and
the law may require, after its execution, new formalities to be complied with.
These, as well as other formalities, must have been observed by all testators
domiciled in the jurisdiction at the time of their death, without reference to
their domicil when the will was executed.
4. In order that the principles of "comity" may be invoked in favor of the wills
of testators domiciled elsewhere, they must have resided in anotherState at the
time of their death. The will is then enforced in accordance with the rules of
international law applicable to the subject.
5. An act done in another State, in order to create rights which our Courts ought
to enforce on the ground of comity, must be of such a character, that if done in
this State in conformity with its laws, it could not be constitutionally impaired
by subsequent legislation. Per DENIo, J.
6. H., the alleged testator, made his will of personal estate in South Carolina, where
he then resided. He did not, when it was executed, declare to the subscribing
witnesses that it was his last will and testament. This declaration was not necessary by the law of that State, and it was conceded that the will was at the time
properly executed for South Carolina purposes. After making his will he removed to New York, where he resided at the time of his death. In this State
such a declaration is necessary. He died without republishing his will. Held,
that the will was void, and that H. died intestate.
7. The law of the continent of Europe is not to be resorted to in determining a
question of this kind, until the sources of instruction, furnished by the Courts
and jurists of England and of this country, have been exhausted.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
DENIO, J.-One of the requisites to a valid will of real or personal property, according to the Revised Statutes, is, that the
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testator should, at the time of subscribing it, or at the time of
acknowledging it, declare, in the presence of at least two attesting
witnesses, that it is his last will and testament: 2 R. S., p. 63,
§ 40. The will which the Surrogate of New York admitted to
probate, by the order under review, was defectively executed in
this particular-the only statement which the alleged testator made
to the witnesses being that it was his signature and seal which
was affixed to it. It was correctly assumed by the Surrogate in
his opinion, and by the Supreme Court in pronouncing its judgment of affirmance, that the instrument could not be sustained as
a will under tle provisions of the Revised Statutes, but that, if it
could be upheld at all, it must be as a will executed in another
State, according to the law prevailing there; and, upon that view,
it was established by both these tribunals as a valid testament.
In point of fact the instrument was drawn, signed, and attested at
Charleston, in South Carolina, where such a declaration of the
testator to the witnesses, as has been mentioned, is not required
to constitute a valid execution of a will. Mr. Hunt, the alleged
testator, resided at that time in Charleston; but, some time before
his death, he removed to the city of New York, and he continued
to reside in that city from .that time until his death. The will
was validly executed according to the laws of South Carolina.
Although the language of our statute, to which reference has
been made, includes, in its generality, all testamentary dispositions, it is, nevertheless, true, that wills, duly executed and taking
effect in other States or countries, according to the laws in force
there, are recognised in our Courts as valid acts, so far as concerns the disposition of personal property: Parsons vs. Lyman,
20 N. Y. 103. This is according to the law of international comity.
Every country enacts such laws as it sees fit as to the disposition
of personal property by its own citizens, either inter vivos or testamentary; but these laws are of no inherent obligation in any
other country. Still, all civilized nations agree, as a general rule,
to recognise titles to movable property created in other States or
countries in pursuance of the laws existing there, and by parties
domiciled in such States or countries. This law of comity is

-
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parcel of the municipal law of the respective countries in which it
is recognised, the evidence of which, in the absence of domestic
legislation or judicial decisions, is frequently sought in the treatises of writers on international law, and in certain commentariep
upon the civil law, which treat more or less copiously upon subjects of this nature.
If the alleged testator in the present case had continued to be an
inhabitant of South Carolina until his death, we should, according
to this principle, have regarded the will as a valid instrument, and
it would have been the duty of our Probate Courts to have granted
letters testamentary to the executors named in it. The statute
contemplates such a case when it provides for the proving of such
wills upon a commission to be issued by the Chancellor, and for
granting letters upon a will admitted to probate in another State:
2 R. S., p. 67, §§ 68, 69. These provisions do not profess to define
under what circumstances a will made in a foreign jurisdiction,
not in conformity with our laws, shall be valid. It only assumes
that such wills may exist, and provides for their proof.
The question in the present case is, whether, inasmuch as the
testator changed his domicil after the instrument was signed and
attested, and was, at the time of his death, a resident citizen of
this State, he can, within the sense of the law of comity, be said
to have made his will in South Carolina. The paper which was
signed at Charleston had no effect upon the testator's property
while he remained in that State, or during his lifetime. It is of
the essence of a will that, until the testator's death, it is ambulatory and revocable. No rights of property, or powers over property, were conferred upon any one by the execution of this instrument; nor were the estate, interest, or rights of the testator in his
property in any way abridged or qualified by that act. The transaction was, in its nature, inchoate and provisional. It prescribed
the rules by which his succession should be governed, provided he
did not change his determination in his lifetime. I think sufficient
consideration was not given to this peculiarity of testamentary dispositions, in the view which the learned Surrogate took of the case.
According to his opinion, a will, when signed and attested in con-
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formity with the 16w of the testator's domicil, is a Y"consummate
and perfect transaction." In one sense it is, no doubt, a finished
affair; but I think it is no more consummate than a bond would be
which the obligor had prepared for use by signing and sealing, but
had kept in his own possession for future use. The cases, I qoncede,
are not entirely parallel; for a will, if not revoked, takes effect by
the death of the testator, which must inevitably happen at some
time, without the performance of any other act on his part, or the
will of any other party; while the uttering of a written obligation,
intended to operate inter vivs, requires a further volition of the
party to be bound, and the intervention of another party to accept
a delivery to give it vitality. But, until one or the other of these
circumstances-namely, the death, in the case of a will, or the delivery, where the instrument is an obligation-occur, the instrument
is of no legal significancy. In the case of a will it requires the
death of the party, and in that of a bond a delivery of the instritment, to indue it with any legal operation or effect. The existence
of a will, duly executed and attested at one period during a testator's lifetime, is a circumstance of no legal importance. He must
die leaving such a will, or the case is one of intestacy: Betts vs.
Jackson, 6 Wend. 173-181. The provisions of a will made before
!he enactment of the Revised Statutes, and in entire conformity
with the law as it then existed, but which took effect by the death
of the testator afterwards, were held to be annulled by certain
enactments of these Statutes respecting future estates, notwithstanding the saving contained in the repealing act, to the effect that
the repeal of any statutory provision shall not affect any act done,
&c., previous to the time of the repeal: De Peystervs. Ulendenning,
8 Paige, 295; 2 R. S., p. 779, § 5; Bishop vs. Bihqp, 4 Hill, 138.
The Chancellor declared that the trusts and provisions of the will
must depend upon the law as it was when it took effect by the death
of the testator; and the Supreme Court affirmed that doctrine.
There is no distinction, in principle, between general acts bearing
upon testamentary provisions, like the statute of uses and trusts,
and particular directions regarding the formalities to be observed
in authenticating the instrument; and I do not doubt that all the
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wills executed under the former law, and which fail to conform to
the new one, where the testators survived the enactment of the
Revised Statutes, would have been avoided, but for the saving in
the 70th section, by which the new statute was not to impair the
validity of the execution of a will made before it took effect: 2 R.
S., p. 68. If, as hag been suggested, a will was a consummated
and perfect transaction before the death of a testator, no change
in the law subsequently made would affect it-the rule being, that
what has been validly done and perfected respecting private rights
under an existing statute, is not affected by a repeal of the law:
.Beg. vs. The Inhabitants of Denton, 18 Adolph. & Ellis, 761, per
Lord Campbell, C. J.
If then a will legally executed under a law of this State, would
be avoided by a subsequent change made in the law before the
testator's death, which should require different or additional formalities, it would seem that we could not give effect to one duly
made in a foreign state or country, but which failed to conform to
the laws of this State, where, at the time of its taking effect by
the testator's death, he was no longer subject to the foreign law,
but was fully under the influence of our own legal institutions.
The question in each case is, whether there has been an act done
and perfected under the law governing the transaction. If there
has been, a subsequent change of residence would not impair the
validity of the act. We should be bound to recognise it by the
law of comity, just as we would recognise and give validity to a
bond reserving eight per cent. interest, executed in a State where
that rate is allowed, or a transfer of property which was required
to be under seal, but which had in fact been executed by adding a
scroll to the signer's name in a State where that stood for a seal
or the like. An act done in another State, in order to create
rights which our courts ought to enforce on the ground of comity,
must be of such a character that, if done in this State, in conformity with our laws, it could not be constitutionally impaired by
subsequent legislation. An executed transfer of property, real or
personal, is a contract within the protection of the Constitution of
the United States, and it creates rights of property which our own
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Constitution guarantees against legislative confiscation. Yet, I
presume, no one would suppose that a law prescribing new qualifications to the right of devising or bequeathing real or personal
property, or new regulations as to the manner of doing it, and
making the law applicable in terms to all cases where wills had
not already taken effect by the death of the testator, would be
constitutionally objectionable.
I am of opinion that a will has never been considered, and that
it is not by the law of this State, or the law of England, a perfect
transaction, so as to create rights which the courts can recognise
or enforce, until it has become operative by the death of the testator. As to all such acts which remain thus inchoate, they are
in the nature of unexecuted intentions. The author of them may
change his mind, or the State may determine that it is inexpedient to allow them to take effect, and require them to be done in
another manner. If the law-making power may do this by an act
operating upon wills already executed, in this State, it would seem
reasonable that a general act, like the statute of wills, contained
in the Revised Statutes, would apply itself to all wills thereafter
to take effect by the death of the testator in this State, wherever
they might be made; and that the law of comity, which has been
spoken of, would not operate to give validity to a will executed in
another State, but which had no legal effect there until after the
testator, br coming to reside here, had fully subjected himself to
our laws; nor then, until his testamentary act had taken effect by
his death.
It may be that this conclusion would not, in all cases, conform
to the expectations of testators. It is quite possible that a person coming here from another State, who had executed his will
before his removal, according to the law of his former residence,
might rely upon the validity of that act; and would die intestate,
contrary to his intention, in consequence of our laws exacting
additional formalities with which he was unacquainted. But it
may be also that a well-informed man, coming here under the
same circumstances, would omit to republish, according to our
laws, his will, made at his former domicil, because he had concluded
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not to give legal effect, in this jurisdiction, to the views as to
the disposition of his property which he entertained when it was
executed. The only practical rule is, that every one must be supposed to know the law under which he lives, and conform his acts
to it. This is the rule of law upon all other subjects, and I do
not see any reason why it should not be in respect to the execution.
of wills.
In looking for precedents and juridical opinions upon such a
question, we ought, before searching elsewhere, to resort to those
of the country from which we derive our legal system, and to
those furnished by the courts and jurists of our own country. It
is only after we have exhausted these sources of instruction without success, that we can profitably seek for light in the works of
the jurists of the Continent of Europe.
The principle adopted by the Surrogate is that, as to the formal
requirements in the execution of a will, the law of the country
where it was in fact signed and attested, is to govern, provided
the testator was then domiciled in such country, though he may
have afterwards changed his domicil, and have been at his death a
domiciled resident of a country whose laws required different formalities. Upon an attentive examination of the cases which have
been adjudged in the English and American courts, I do not Pnd
anything to countenance this doctrine; but much authority of
quite'a different tendency. The result of the cases, I think, is
that the jurisdiction in which the instrument was signed and attested, is of no consequence, but that its validity must be determined according to the domicil of the testator at the time of his
death. Thus, in Grattan vs. Appleton, 3 Story's R. 755, the
alleged testamentary papers were signed in Boston, where the
assets were, and the testator died there, but he was domiciled in
the British Province of New Brunswick. The provincial statute
required two attesting witnesses, but the alleged will was unattested.
The court declared the papers invalid, Judge Story stating the
rule to be firmly established, that the law of the testator's
domicil was to govern in relation to his personal property, though
the will might have been executed in another State or country
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*where a different rule prevailed. The Judge referred, approvingly,
to Desesbat8 vs. Berquier, 1 Bin. 836, decided as long ago as 1808.
That was the case of a will executed in St. Domingo by a person
domiciled there, and sought to be enforced in Pennsylvania, where
the effects of the deceased were. It appeared not to have been
executed according to the laws of St. Domingo, though it was
conceded that it would have been a good will if executed by a
citizen of Pennsylvania. The alleged will was held to be invalid.
In the opinion delivered by Chief Justice Tilghman, the cases
in the -English Ecclesiastical Courts, and the authorities of the
writers on the law of nations, were carefully examined. It was
declared to be settled, that the succession to the personal estate
of an intestate was to be regulated according to the law of the
country in which he was a domiciliated inhabitant at the time of
his death, and that the same rule prevailed with respect to last
wills. I have referred to these cases from respectable courts in the
United States, because their judgments are more familiar to the
baitban the reports of the spiritual courts in England. But these
decisions are fully sustained by a series of well considered judgments of these courts: De Bonneval vs. De Bonneval, 1 Curt. 856;
Curley vs. Thornton, 2 Addams 6; Stanley vs. Bernes, 3 Hag. 873;
Counte8s Feraris vs. Hfertford, 3 Curt. 468. It was, for a time,
attempted to qualify the doctrine in cases where the testator was
a British subject, who had taken up his residence and actual domicil in a foreign country, by the principle that it was legally impossible for one to abjure the country of his birth, and that therefore such a person could not change his domicil; but the judgment
of the High Court of Delegates, in Stanley vs. Bernes, finally put
the question at rest. In that case, an Englishman, domiciled in
Portugal, and resident in the Portuguese Island of Madeira, made
a will and four codicils, all of which were executed according to
the Portuguese law, except the two last codicils, and they were
all executed so as to be valid wills by the law of England, if it
governed the case. Letters were granted upon the will and two
first codicils, but the other codicils were finally pronounced against.
The reporter's note expresses the result in these words: "If a
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testator (though a British subject) be domiciled abroad, he must
conform, in his testamentary acts, to the formalities required by
the lex domicilii." See, also, Somerville vs. Somerville, 5 Yes.
750 ; and Pricevs. Dewhurst, 8 Simons 279, in the English Court
of Chancery.
It is true that none of these decisions present the case of a
change of domicil, after the signing and attesting of a will. They
are, notwithstanding, fully in point, if I have taken a correct view
of the nature and effect of a will during the lifetime of the testator. But the remarks of judges in deciding the cases, and the
understanding of the reporters clearly show, that it is the domicil
of the testator at the time of his death which is to be considered
in seeking for the law which is to determine the validity of the will.
Thus, in De Bonneval vs. De Bonneval, the question was upon the
validity of the will executed in England, of a French nobleman,
who emigrated in 1792, and died in England in 1836. Sir Herbert Jenner states it to have been settled by the case of Stanle9
vs. Bernes, that the law of the place of the domicil, and not-the
lex loci rei sitze governed "the distribution of, and succession to,
The reporter's note
personal property in testacy or intestacy."
is, that the validity of a will "is to be determined by the law of
the country where the deceased was domiciled at his death."
Nothing is more clear than that it is the law of the country
where the deceased was domiciled at the time of his death, which is
to regulate the succession of his personalty in the case of intestacy.
Judge Story says, that the universal doctrine, as recognised by the
common law, is, that the succession to personal property, ab intestato, is governed exclusively by the law of the actual domicil of the
intestate at the time of his death: Conf. Laws, § 481. It would be
plainly absurd to fix upon any prior domicil in another country.
The one which attaches to him at the instant when the devolution
of property takes place, is manifestly the only one which can have
anything to do with the question. Sir Richard Pepper Arden,
Master of the Rolls, declared, in Somerville vs. Somerville, that the
rule was, that the succession to the personal estate of an intestate
was to be regulated by the law of the country in which he was
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domiciled at the time of his death, without any regard whatever
to the place of nativity, or the place where his actual death happened, or the local situation of his effects.
Now, if the legal rules which prevail in the country where the
deceased was domiciled at his death, are those which are to be
resorted to in case of an intestacy, it would seem reasonable that
the laws of the same country ought to determine, whether in a given
case, there is an intestacy or not, and such we have seen was the
view of Chief Justice Tilghman. Sir Lancelot Shadwell, ViceChancellor, in Price vs. Dewhurst, also expressed the same view.
He said, "I apprehend that it is now clearly established by a great
variety of cases, which it is not necessary to go through in detail,
that the rule of law is this': that when a person dies intestate, his
personal estate is to be administered according to the law of the
country in which he was domiciled at the time of his death, whether
he was a British subject or not; and the question whether he died
intestate or not, must be determined by the law of the same country."
The method of arriving at a determination in the present case,
according to this rule, is to compare the evidence of the execution
of his will with the requirements of the Revised Statutes. Such a
comparison would show that the deceased did not leave a valid will,
and, consequently, that he died intestate.
Being perfectly convinced that according to the principles of
the common law, touching the nature of last wills, and according
to the result of the cases in England and in this country, which
have been referred to, the will under consideration cannot be sustained, I have not thought it profitable to spend time in collecting
the sense of the foreign jurists, many of whose opinions have been
referred to and copiously extracted, in the able opinion of the
learned Surrogate, if I had convenient access to the books, which
is not the case.
I understand it to be conceded that there is a diversity of opinion
upon the point under consideration among most writers; but it is
said that the authors who assert that the doctrine on which I have
been insisting, are not those of the highest character, and that their
opinions have been criticised with success by M. Felix himself, a
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systematic writer of reputation on the conflict of laws. Judge
Story, however, who has wrought in this mine of learning with a
degree of intelligence and industry which has excited the admiration of English and American judges, has come to a different conclusion. His language is, "but it may be asked, what will be the
effect of a change of domicil after a will or testament is made, of
personal or movable property, if it is valid by the law of the place
where the party was domiciled when it was made, and not valid by
the law of his domicil at the time of his death? The terms in
which the general rule is laid down would seem sufficiently to establish the principle that in such a case the will and testament is void;
for it is the law of his actual domicil at the time of his death, and
not the law of his domicil at the time of his making his will and
testament of personal property, which is to govern :" § 473. He
then quotes at length the language of John Voet to the same general effect. It must, however, be admitted that the examples put by
that author, and quoted by Judge Story, relate to testamentary
capacity as determined by age, and to the legal ability of the legatees to take, and not to the form of executing the instrument. And
the Surrogate has shown, by an extract from the same author, that
a will executed in one country according to the solemnities there
required, is not to be broken solely by a change of domicil to a
place whose laws demand other solemnities. Of the other jurists
quoted by the Surrogate, several of them lay down rules diametrically opposite to those which confessedly prevail in this country
and in England. Thus, Toullier, a writer on the civil law of
France, declares that the form of testaments does not depend upon
the law of the domicil of the testator, but upon the place where
the instrument is in fact executed; and Felix, Malin, and Pothier
are quoted as laying down the same principle. But nothing is more
clear upon the English and American cases, than that the place of
executing the will, if it is different from the testator's domicil, has
nothing to do with determining the proper form of executing and
attesting. In the case referred to from Story's Reports, the will
was executed in Boston, but was held to be invalid because it was
not attested as required by a provincial statute of New Brunswick,
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which was the place of the testator's domicil. But if the present
appeal was to be determined according to the civil law, I should
desire to examine the authorities more fully than I have been able
to do; but considering it to depend upon the law as administered in
the English and American courts, and that according to these tribunals it is the law of the domicil of the testator at the time of his
death that is to govern, and not that of the place where the paper
happened to be signed and attested, where that is different from his
domicil at the time of his decease, I cannot doubt that the Surrogate and Supreme Court fell into an error in establishing the will.
I have not overlooked an argument which has been addressed to
us, based upon certain amendments of the Revised Statutes, contained in chapter 820 of the act of 1830. The revised code of the
State, as originally enacted, had omitted to make provision for the
proving of wills, where the attesting witnesses resided out of the
State, and their attendance here could not be procured. The Surrogates' Courts to which they committed the proof of wills of real
and personal estates, being tribunals of special jurisdiction, and
having no common law powers like the Supreme Court, cguld not
issue a commission in such cases, and hence there might often be a
failure of justice. It might happen, in various ways, that the witnesses to a will would reside out of the jurisdiction of this State.
If the will were executed here by a resident citizen, in the usual
manner, the witnesses might change their residence and live in
some other State or country, when it came to be proved; or it
might be executed out of the State according to the forms prescribed by our statute of wills, by a resident of this State who was
temporarily abroad. In either case, the will would be perfectly
valid, though the Surrogate having jurisdiction would be unable to
admit it to probate for want of power to cause the testimony to be
taken and returned. To remedy this inconvenience, five new sections were introduced, in 1830, by way of amendment, to the title
of the Revised Statutes, respecting the proof of wills, numbered
from 63 to 67, inclusive. The provision which they make is limited
to the case of "a will duly executed according to the laws of this
State, where the witnesses to the same reside out of the jurisdiction
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of this State;" and, in regard to such wills, it is enacted that
they may be proved by means of a commission issued by the Chancellor upon the application of any person interested; and detailed
directions are given respecting the return of the proof, the allowance of the will, and the record of it in the office of the Surrogate
having jurisdiction.
But, thus far, the proof of a will made in a foreign jurisdiction,
according to the laws of such jurisdiction, and taking effect there
by the death of the testator, was left unprovided for. Such wills
are perfectly valid as to personal assets in this State, as was shown
in Parsons vs. Lyman. We recognise the foreign will, according
to the comity of nations, just as we do the rules of distribution and
of inheritance of another country when operating upon a domiciled
citizen of such country who has died there, leaving assets in this
State. Then, as tor the proof of such wills, the section following
those just mentioned provides for the case in these words:-" Wills
of personal estate, duly executed by persons residing out of this
State, according to the laws of the State or country in which the
same were made, may be proved under a commission to be issued
by the Chancellor, and when so proved, may be established and
transmitted to the Surrogate having jurisdiction," &c., § 68. The
remainder of the section provides for the case of such a foreign
will which has been proved in the foreign .jurisdiction. Letters testamentary are to be issued in such cases upon the production of an
authenticated copy of the will. It is clearly enough implied, perhaps, by the language of this section, that the will to be proved
and established under its provisions, and which is allowed to be executed, as to assets, in this State, must be a legal will, according to
the law of the testator's domicil in which it was executed; but, for
abundant caution, a section is added to the effect that "no will of
personal estate, made out of this State, by a person not being a
citizen of this State, shall be admitted to probate under either of the
preceding provisions, unless such will shall have been executed according to the laws of the State or country in which the same was
made," § 69. Chancellor Walworth appears to have understood
the words, "a citizen of this State," as used in this section, to refer
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to political allegiance; and, "in the matter of Roberts's will," 8
Paige, 446, he held that the will then in question, executed in the
island of Cuba, and which had been proved under a commission,
and had been shown to be executed according to the laws of Spain,
was a legal will, though the testator was a resident of this State at
the time of his death. But he put the decision on the ground that
the testator was a foreigner, and not a citizen, though domiciled here,
and upon a verbal construction of the 69th section. But Mr. Hunt,
the alleged testator in the will now in question, was not only domiciled
here, but he was, at his death, a citizen of this State, and, consequently, the section, as interpreted by the Ohancellor, has no application to the case. He, however, fully admitted the rule of law
to be as I have stated it, in cases not within the influence of the
69th section. "The provision of the Revised Statutes requiring
wills of personal property to be executed in the presenc5 of two witnesses," he says, "does not apply to wills executed out of this
State by persons domiciled in the State or country where the will
is made, and who continue to be thus domiciled at the time the will
takes effect by death." "As the testator resided in this State at
the time of his death, in 1837, this will would be valid according
to the law of the testator's domicil when the will took effect by death,
if he had been a citizen at that time. But, bs he was a foreigner,
and there is no evidence that he was ever naturalized here, the
amendments of the Revised Statutes of 1830, under which the present proceedings are instituted, expressly prohibit the admitting of
the will to probate by a decree of this Court, unless it was also duly
executed according to the laws of the country where it was actually
made." But for this case, I should have been of the opinion that
the words, "a citizen of this State," as used in the 69th section,
did not refer to political allegiance, but were used in the sense of a
domiciled inhabitant of this State. The meaning of the section
would then be, that, if a person, other than a domiciled inhabitant
of this State, makes his will out of this State, it must be executed
according to the laws of the State or country where made, or it cannot be admitted to probate here, according to the preceding provisions of the act. The Chancellor seems to me to have taken tho
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same view of the statute when passing upon the execution of the
will of Catharine Roberts: 8 Paige, 519. He says, "The statute,
in express terms, authorizes a will personally executed out of the
State, by a person not domiciled here, to be admitted to probate,
provided it is duly executed according to the laws of the State or
country where the same was made; and prohibits all other foreign
wills from being admitted to probate, under the special provisions
incorporated into the statutes of April, 1830." The words, "a
person not domiciled here," are used in the paraphrase as the
equivalent of "a person not being a citizen of this State," and I
think that rendering is perfectly correct. The provisions of the
act do not, in my opinion, suggest any distinction between the place
where a will is actually signed and attested and that in which it
takes effect by the death of the testator. They are intended to
provide simply for the case of the will of a person domiciled out of
the State which it is desired to prove here; and the statutory mandate is, in effect, that it shall not be established here unless it was
executed according to the requirements of the foreign law.
The will under immediate consideration was not, we think, legally
executed, and the determination of the Surrogate and of the
Supreme Court, which gave it effect, must be reversed.
COMSTOCK, Ch. J., LOTT, JAMES,
The precise question discussed and
adjudged in this case, has, it is believed,
not been decided in England. In this
country, the only case in which it has
been previously adjudged, is Nat vs.
Coons, 10 Missouri, 543. The will in
that case was executed in Mississippi,
the testator's domicil, in 1836. The
testator removed to Missouri in 1887,
and resided there till his death in 1838.
It was held that the instrument was a
Missouri will, and that its validity must
be tested by the law of that State. This
case, though it agrees in its conclusions
-vith the present, was not fully argued,
and has not been often cited. The principZes which ought to govern the ques-

and HOYT, JJ., concurred.

tion are well established, and evince the
correctness of the decision.
L It is a well settled rule in regard
to contracts, that the law of the place
where they are made controls the formalities and solemnities attending their
execution. If valid there, they are valid
everywhere.
IL It has been attempted on the continent of Europe to extend the same rule
to wills. The maxim is "locus regit
actum." The French Court of Cassation
has declared that the forms of the place
of making the will are to be preferred
to the law of the domicil. Fcelix on International Law, 8d edit., p. 166, note a.
Savigny, however, recommends that a
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person who makes his will abroad should
on his return make another, Vol. 8, p.
356.1 It is only safe to follow these
authors as guides, when we bear in
mind that they attempt to apply to a
will the same rule which exists as to a
contract.
Ill. This doctrine has found no lodgement in the common law as expounded
by the courts in England, or by text
writers. Says Dr. Lushington in Croker
vs. M. Hertford, 4 Moore, P. C., 358,
"there is a wide distinction between a
iwill and a contract." The validity of a
will of personal estate as to form is to
be governed by the law of the place of
the testator's domicil. So that if he reside in one place, and make his will in
another State, where all his personal
property may be, the validity of the will
is to be determined by the law of the
place of his residence. The maxim
"4mobiliagequuntur personam" when applied to wills, means that personal property follows the law of the testator's
domicil. The leading case on this subject is Stanley vi. Bernes, 3 Hagg. 373,
and is so pronounced by Lord Wensleydale, in Whicker vs. Hume, 7 House of
Lords Cases, 165. See also Bremer vs.
Freeman, 10 Moore Priv. C. Cas. 306.
That case was argued for the principle
by Dr. Lushington when at the bar, and
the conclusions then presented are approved by him as a judge. It was there
held that an Englishman domiciled
abroad (in Portugal) must conform in
his testamentary acts to the formalities
required by the lex domicil. The reasons
of the decision are not given by the

"Delegates," who reversed Sir John
Nicholl's decision to the contrary, but
they undoubtedly proceeded on Dr.
Lushington's argument.
This argument is so clear and conclusive that it is worthy of being reproduced. "The fact of the codicils being
executed in the English form, whether
used as an argument to show the testator's intention of returning, or for their
validity, amounts to nothing. It is said,
it was his intention not to. adopt the
Portuguese forms; it was his intention
to pass his property in England, and the
question is, could he do so in the way
he has adopted? If intention alone is
to have effect, there would be no need of
any form; but the law of all countries
requires that the intention should be
expressed so that the law may understand it, and that the personal property
may be distributed according to its rules.
If it be a clear principle of law that
personal property has no locality, that the
law of the place (of the property) is not
to be looked to at all, it follows as a
necessary deduction, that the case of a
party dying leaving a will must be liable
to, the same rules as in a case of intestacy. The law which binds the person
governs the effects. If then the person of
the testator was governed by the law of
Portugal, so must the will be-if the property is distributable by the law of Portugal, the instrument should be valid by
that law. If intestate, it is conceded
that his property, in whatever country,
would pass according to the Portuguese
law; how then are we to find whether
he is intestate or not? If the will by

I Tkis suggestion was made on account of Eiohhorn's view, (Deutsches Recht,
"locus regit actum" has one qualification, which is that if
a testator who had made his will abroad in a manner not allowed by the domicil,
returned to his home before death, the will would be void. This idea has not been
adbpted by others.

47), that tire maxim
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the Portuguese law is invalid, he is intestate in Portugal. Supposing it to be
valid by every other law, but invalid by
the law of Portugal, then the property
would go according to the Portuguese
law as in a case of intcstacy. We contend then on principle, if it be once established that in cases of intestacy the
law of the domicil is to prevail, it must
follow that in testacy, it must also,
otherwise you cannot find out whether
the party be intestate or not." No clearer
or more compact statement of the principle can be found or desired, and the
decision has been recognised over and
over again. Foreign law then cannot be
cited upon the subject of the testamentary acts of testators domiciled here, with
any profit. In fact, it is a matter of
mere municipal regulation. "There is
no instance in which foreign law has
been resorted to as a guide whether a
testamentary paper of a domiciled Englishman should be valid or not :" 4 Moore
P. C. 358. "The law of domicil is alone
regarded, and the rule ' locus regit ncturn' cannot prevail over it. No trace in
the history of English testamentary law
is to be found of thQ introduction of this
principle, and it is difficult to discover
how the laws of other nations on matters
which are purely municipal, should form
any sufficient ground for the introduction of a new statute to govern the testamentary acts of domiciled Englishmen." Id. The doctrine enunciated in
Stanley vs. Bernes is approved in this
country in the cases cited in the principal case.
IV. The question still remains as between the domicil at the time of execution of the will, and the domicil at the
time of death. There are two questions:
1. By which of the two shall the "intrinsic validity" of the will be governed?
By this phrase is meant, the proportion
of the estate which can be disposed of,

the capacity of the testator, and of the
legatees, the power to disinherit heirs,
&c., &c. Nearly all jurists agree that
such questions are to be determined by
the law of the domicil at the time of
death. Foelix on International Law, J
117. Says this author, "the intrinsic
validity of acts depends on the law of the
place where they have received their
perfection or completion," 8 Savigny,
312; Westlake on Private International
Law, 328.
2. The second question is as to the
"formal or extrinsic validity" of the
will. If a will is duly executed by the law
of the domicil, and afterwards the domicil is changed and continues so until
death, shall the law of the latter domicil
prevail? Foelix answers this question in
the negative. He places his determination, however, upon the maxim, which
the English law discards, "locus regit
actum." "The will preserves its validity as far as form is concerned, notwithstanding a change in the testator's domicil, because this form depends on the law
of the place where the will was made ;"
(le testament conserve sa validit6 quant
Ala forme, nonobstant le changement de
domicile du testateur, parceque cette
forme depend do la loi du lieu de Is confection de l'acte,) 117, also 77. This
reason, though perfectly legitimate under the French law, is of no force here,
since the decision of Stanley vs. Bernes,
which declares the law of the domicil to
be the rule which governs the original
validity of the act.
Mr. Westlake, although he discards
the maxim, "locus regit actum," as applicable to wills, agrees with Foelix in
the kesult. His reasons are as follows:
"If a change be made from a foreign
domicil to an English one, we shall have
to decide for ourselves on the continuing
validity of the foreign will, and then I
submit it should be maintained whenever
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conformable either to the 'lex loci conditi
testamenti,' or to the law of the then
domicil, for it can never be imagined, that
by the transference of his domicil to
England the testator intended tactitly to
revoke his will, more especially since by
the continental law, with which alone
from his previous life he can be supposed
to be acquainted, such transference would
not have that effect :" Westlake on Private International Law, 823, 4, 5, 6, 7,
8. The author here falls into a double
mistake. First, in supposing that this
question is one simply of a foreign testa-tor domiciled here, which will be shown
hereafter not to be true; and, second, in
maintaining that the intention of the testator has anything to do with the validity
of a will. "The law that binds the person governs the effects." The law of the
domicil at the time of the testator's death
must prevail, for the following reasons:
1. Because on the distinction which
the continental writers make between
the extrinsic and intrinsic validity of
the will, between matters of form and
matters of substance, the law as to the
number of witnesses, and the solemnities attending the execution of the instrument, belongs to substance, and not
merely to form.
The witnesses are
placed about the testator to watch his
capacity, and to observe that no fraud is
practised, or undue influence or restraint
exercised, and, in general, to see that
his intentions are carried into effect.
They are placed thus by the law, and not
by the testator. It is true that he selects them, but the law declares their
function. They are in a sense ministers
of justice. Foelix candidly admits this
difficulty. "The qualities of notaries,
and of witnesses* may be regarded as
belonging to intrinsic formalities-the
circumstance that the laws exact in the
witnesses of the act certain qualities
which it does not require in those who

depose simply in a court of justice to
facts of which they have knowledge,
shows that in assisting at the making of
a will, the witnesses exercise, so to
speak, a public authority. Thus, the
ancient authors regard the assistance of
the witnesses, and their number, as a
substantial, and not as a probative formality:" J 71, note 1. On this principle,
in accordance with their own distinction,
the foreign jurists should hold that the
law of the domicil at the time of death
should govern the transaction, except as
to mere matters of form, such as the
necessity of affixing a seal, or the writing
the will upon some particular substance.
2. If a testator, domiciled in a State
where he made his will, continued to
be so domiciled at the time of his death,
the validity of the will could only be determined at death. His capacity might
be restricted or taken away, the will
might be made inoperative, or its effect
might be enlarged. Such a statute
would be in no sense retrospective, nor
would it interfere with vested rights,
because heirs, devisees, or legatees, have
no rights until the testator's death. The
rules of construction would, therefore, be
in no sense violated by holding that a
statute of this kind operates upon anterior as well as upon subsequent wills.
Cases of the first kind, affecting capacity,
are Wakefield vs. Phelps, 37 N. H. 295;
Loveren vs. Lamprey, 2 Foster, N. H.
434; cases of the second class are
stated in the opinion; cases of the
third class, where the effect of the
will was enlarged, are Cushing vs.
Alwin, 12 Met. 169, (1847); Pray vs.
Waterston, Id. 262. They all proceed
upon the same principle. Though Brewster vs. McCall, 15 Conn. 274, and Mullock vs. Souder, 5 Watts & Sergeant, 198,
are contrary to this view, the principle
will not be shaken. They were decided
without extensive argument, without
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satisfactory reasons for the judgments,
and are opposed to the current of decisions. The case in Watts & Sergeant is
made to depend upon a certificate given
by the judges to the Chancellor, in Ashburnham vs. Bradshaw, 2 Atk. 36, followed by Willett vs. Sandford, 1 Ves.
176. The question there -was, whether a
will of real estate, made before the
Statute of Mortmain, 9 Geo. 2, c. 36, the
testator having survived the passage of
the act, was rendered void so far as it
came in conflict with that law. It was
decided that the will was not affected by
the statute. This case was, however,
evidently disapproved by the Lord Chancellor in Attorney-General vs. Heartwell,
Ambler, 451, where he states that the decision cannot be applicable to personal
property. "The statute makes an intestacy."
It could only be applied
to real estate, because a devise was
regarded as in the nature of a conveyance. The case itself must be considered as overruled in this country by the
decisions previously cited, which were,
in some instances, devises of real estate.
Assuming these cases to be correct,
they decide that a statute operating upon
a will, may destroy it, and that all persons domiciled here when the will was
made, and when the statute took effect,
would be governed by it. What possible
distinction can be stated between this
and other classes of domiciled persons?
Many persons discuss this question as
though it were one of private international law. It is, however, one of purely
municipal law, as Dr. Lushington states
it. This will appear from the following
supposed cases. There may be suggested, among others: 1st. The case of a
domiciled citizen, who, having been subsequently domiciled abroad, made his
will and returned to his original residence. 2. The case of a domiciled for-

eigner under the same facts. 3. The
case of a foreigner, who, having made
his will at his home, becomes a resident
naturalized citizen. 4. The case of a foreigner, who, having made his will at
home, becomes domiciled here-a resident alien. The first case would resolve itself into the question, Can, or
should, the State govern that class of
its resident citizens who have once been
domiciled abroad, in the same manner
as other citizens ? The laws of the
State operate upon the wills of all permanently residing citizens, deciding
their validity at the moment of death.
Can any reason be suggested why this
should notbe trueof allresident citizens?
Every new statute of general nature
ought undoubtedly to be construed to
govern all the citizens who were subject
to it at the time of its passage, unless
it would operate retrospectively, or be
contrary to some constitutional provision. The power of the State to give
this effect to the statute, no one will
deny. The foreign rule does not rest
upon positive right, but upon consent,
express or implied: Fcelix,
68. As
the question then becomes one purely
of constructionof a statute, it is impossible to state any valid reason for exempting one class of citizens and not the
other. A will made abroad by a citizen
afterwards returning to his native country, certainly ought not, upon principles
of comity, to be any more sacred than
one made at home.
If this be true of statutes passed after
the citizen became re-domiciled, it
would be equally true of previously existing laws. Otherwise, it would be necessary to re-enact the statutes continually to bind citizens, once residing
abroad, and resuming their former domicil. We cannot, therefore, escape the
conclusion, that the statute of wills ope-
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rates upon all native born citizens domiciled here at their death, and that the
question is wholly one of domestic law.
No reason can be stated why the other
cases should not be solved in the same
way, since the case of Stanley vs. Bernes,
has decided that domiciled foreigners
are subject to our laws regarding wills,
in the same manner as domiciled citizens.
The result is, that in all cases of the
execution of a will of personal estate,
the law of the domicil where the will
is made, is only provisional. If the
instrument is not, in fact, executed
according to that law, yet, if the solemxtities required by the laws of the
domicil at the time of death, happen
to be observed, the will is valid. So, on
the other hand, if the law of the domicil is observed, the will is void if the
solemnities of the final residence are not
complied with.
3. The rules as to the distribution of
intestate's estates are admitted to be
those prevailing at his domicil at the
time of his death.
If that be so, the argument of Dr.
Lushington, and of the opinion in the
principal case, is conclusive to show that
the same law must decide whether he
did or did not die intestate.
4. Perhaps some weight should be
given to the view that the right to make
testaments belongs to the domain of positive law, and cannot be claimed as an

inherent or natural right: See the
elaborate historical examination of the
subject in Maine's Ancient Law, Ch. 6
& 7; London, 1861.
The author remarks that "it is doubtful whether a true power of testation
was known to any original society except
the Roman." The general argument,
however, is not affected, though this
proposition should prove untrue.
While no adjudged cases in England
decide the point, the tendency of judicial
opinion is in this direction. In addition
to the cases alluded to in the opinion,
Whicker vs. Hume, 7 House of Lords
Cases, 124, may be cited, where the
statement by all the judges is, that the
law of the domicil, at the time of death,
is to govern the will, and the following
distinct expression from the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, Lord
Wensleydale delivering the opinion: "It
is not necessary to discuss the question
as to what law should govern when a
testator changes his domicil after making
his will, but their lordships do not wish
to intimate any doubt that the law of
domicil at the time of death, is the governing law: Story, 473; nor any, that
the statutes 7 W. IV. and 1 Vict. a. 26,
apply only to wills of those persons who
continue to have an English domicil, and
are consequently regulated by the English law:" Bremer vs. Freeman, 10 Moore
P. C. 306-359.
T_ W. D.

BRIDGMAN vs. HOPKINS.

In the Supreme Court of JFermont-GeneralTerm, Nov., 1861.
BRIDGMAN VS.

HOPKINS.'

In an action of slander, charging the defendant with having accused the plaintiff
of the commission of the crime of adultery, it is competent for the defendant,
in mitigation of damages, to prove that the plaintiff, before the speaking of the
words, was commonly reputed to be unchaste and licentious.

This was an action of slander for charging the plaintiff, an unmarried man, with having had illicit intercourse with a married
woman, and thereby committed the crime of adultery.
On the trial by jury in the County Court, exceptions were taken
to the admission of evidence offered in mitigation of damages, that
before the speaking of the words, the plaintiff's general character
and reputation in the community for chastity was bad; and that
he was generally reputed in the community to be an unchaste and
licentious man.
(Several other exceptions were taken, but not being of much
general interest, they are omitted in the present report of the case.)
J. A. Wing, Counsel for plaintiff.
B. N. Davis, Counsel for defendant.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
J.-It is claimed upon the above exceptions that the
evidence was improperly admitted, for the reason, that while the
alleged slander consisted in charging the plaintiff with having committed the crime of adultery, the evidence of character was not
restricted to general character, in reference to the t echnical kind
and legal quality of the act charged, which rendered the words
slanderous and actionable. In other words, it is claimed that no
evidence as to character was admissible, except such as tended to
show that the plaintiff's general character was Vad in reference to
the crime of adultery. We think the exception is not well founded.
It is uniformly held, that, in this kind of action, the plaintiff puts
BARRETT,

I We are indebted to the courtesy of Mr. Justice Barrett for the following opinion,
for which he will accept our thanks.-Bds. A. L. Reg.
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in issue his character, so far as the amount of damage is concerned, in reference to the subject whereof the alleged slander is
predicated. The act of such intercourse, as the words charged
in this case, is made a crime, and is visited with an ignominious
punishment by provision of statute, contrary both to the common
and ecclesiastical law: 4 Bl. Com. 65.
Undoubtedly, it is this provision of the statute that makes the
words actionable per se. Without that provision, words charging
illicit intercourse with a married woman would have no different
effect, as constituting a cause of antion, from words charging such
intercourse with an unmarried woman. The act, in its moral and
conventional character, would be the same in both cases, and would
have the same bearing upon the character, moral and social, of
the person committing it. The practice of such acts is licentiousness. and the character induced thereby is that of an unchaste and
licentious man, as much so, certainly, when they are practised with
married as unmarried women. This result is as much involved in
acts, which, under the statute, are visited with penalty as a crime,
as in the same kind of acts to which such penalty is not attached.
When, therefore, a plaintiff comes into Court, for the reparation of
the injury brought to his character by the slander alleged in this
case, we think that, as the act charged necessarily involves a specific moral and social debasement, irrespective of the final consequences imposed by the statute, he comes with his character as
affected morally and socially by such debasement, when it has become matter of general reputation, whether produced by his habit
of licentious conduct with married or unmarried women. It would
seem to present to the general sense of the community a strange
incongruity, to hold that the character of a confirmed and notorious debauchee is susceptible of injury to the same extent, by the
charge of a specific act of illicit intercourse with a married woman,
as that of a man unclouded by any suspicion of licentious conduct,
unless such character as a debauchee should be shown to exist with
reference exclusively to the practice of illicit intercourse with
married women;' and the incongruity would be rendered the more
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palpable, if it were to be held that it would require, on this
ground, the same amount of pecuniary remuneration to repair the
damage to the character of the debauchee reprobate, as to that
of the unsuspected chaste man.
Change the state of the case, by supposing that the plaintiff,
being unmarried, by a course of licentious conduct towards unmarried females, had acquired a general character as a licentious debauchee. Having such a character, should he get married, and
soon thereafter be charged with an act of illicit intercourse with
an unmarriedfemale-the same kind of act with the same quality
of subject, by practising which, before marriage, he had acquired
his character, and which, while he was unmarried was not criminal
under the statute, it would present a rare absurdity to hold, that
the fact of his marriage had so obliterated his existing character
up to that time, and had so renovated and purified him, as to place
him in the same category of immunity as the man whose life had
ever been an ensample of purity and chastity; and the absurdity
would be strongly illustrated, if he should have fallen into wedlock
with a female as debauched as himself-an event likely enough to
happen-and would equally involve the application of the rule
claimed by the plaintiff in this case.
It seems clear, that the application of the established rule of
law on this subject cannot be made to depend upon the accidental
circumstance, that either party to the alleged act of illicit intercourse was married, and, by virtue of that circumstance, exclude
evidence of the general character of the plaintiff for licentiousness, existing at the time the words were spoken, when such evidence is offered to affect the amount of damages which he should
properly recover.
This view, in our apprehension, stands upon reasons that fully
justify it, without the support of adjudged cases. Yet, as sustaining it, the case of Stone vs. Varney, 7 Miet. Rep. 86, and of Bowen
vs. Hall, 20 Vt. Rep. 232, may be referred to.
Judgment affirmed.

BRIDGMAN vs. HOPKINS.
The foregoing case incidentally involves a question which, first and last,
and in different forms, has occupied the
time, and tasked the energy of Courts to
a greater extent, than any inherent
difficulty of principle involved, would
seem to justify us in expecting. We
mean the general question of the admissibility of evidence of plaintiff's character in actions of libel and slander.
"That such evidence is admissible in certain cases, we regard as fully settled,
notwithstanding the exceptional cases to
the contrary.
1. Where the defendant justifies words,
spoken or written, which impute crime
to the plaintiff, by alleging the truth of
such charge, he is bound to adduce the
same kind of proof, and many of the
cases say, the same degree of proof,
which would be required to convict the
plaintiff of the offence. And the plaintiff, on his part, is allowed to encounter
this evidence in the same way he would
be, if he were on trial for the crime.
One of these modes, where the direct
evidence leaves the case doubtful, (as
most cases are, more or less,) is by
proof of good character in regard to
the general nature and subject-matter of
the offence charged: Harding vs. Brooks,
5 Pick. R. 244; 3 Greenl. Ev. 25, 26,
and note. And this evidence the plaintiff
may adduce in reply to the defendant's
evidence directly tending to prove him
guilty of the crime, and before any attack
is made upon his general character. And
the English courts have gone so far as to
hold, that if one on trial for a crime
omit to give evidence of general good
character in regard to the subject-matter
of the offence, when he might do so, it
affords just ground of comment to the
jury, in behalf of the prosecutor.
It may be questionable, we think, how
far the American courts would adopt
this view; but the rule of the general
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admissibility of evidence of good character on the part of the accused, is universally recognised here, and there can be
no doubt of its applicability in actions
of libel and slander, where the defence
implies a charge of crime.
2. There can, we think, be no fair
ground to question that it is competent
for the defendant also to give general
evidence of plaintiff's bad reputation in
regard to the particular subject-matter
of the charge contained in. the words
spoken or published. There has been a
good deal of conflict in the decisions
upon this point, and the rule in this
country, in one particular, differs from
that which prevails in the English courts.
But.most of this conflict and apparent
confusion among the decided cases, may
be dissipated by keeping carefully in
mind the proper grounds for the admissibility of this kind of evidence.
The main ground upon which it seems
to us such evidence ought to be received,
is, that it tends to rebut malice in the
defendant. And here, it seems to us,
that the English cases, where evidence
has been received to show that the plaintiff, before the alleged slander; was generally reputed to be guilty of the particular offence or misconduct charged, is
more pertinent to the question of damages, than general reputation that he had
been guilty of similar miscarriages, but
not the same. It is, perhaps, a difference
in degree, rather than in kind; but if
the former is admissible, then it follows,
as it seems to us, a fortiori, that the
latter must be. And this will be the
result, whether we view it in the light
of rebutting malice in the defendant, or
of affording the plaintiff only such da
mages as he has sustained.
It is obvious, in the majority of actions
for defamation, the measure of damages
is far more seriously affected by the degree of malice on the part of the do-

BRIDGMAN vs. HOPKINS.
fendant, than by the positive amount of
injury or damages suffered by the plaintiff. And there are many' instances
where the attempt at defamation on the
part of a malicious defendant, has produced a positive reaction in favor of the
plaintiff, whereby his reputation is raised
to a higher and far more enviable point,
than if it had not been assailed, and
thus a positive accession of credit comes
from the very misconduct of the defendant. This, nevertheless, is no excuse in
law, and generally produces no abatement in the damages awarded by the
jury, provided the conduct of the defendant has been wholly without apology
or excuse, and in its nature wanton and
wicked. Calloway vs. Middleton, 4 A.
K. Marsh, 372.
Hence it is apparent that that is far
more effective evidence on the part of
the defendant, which presents an excuse or occasion for him to have acted, through imprudence and want o f consideration, by giving too hasty credence
to flying rumor, or general opinion,
without testing its foundation; than
that which shows that the plaintiff has
suffered but slight damages, in fact, in
consequence of his former bad reputation upon tile same point.
And it is by no means certain that
persons of a dubious reputation upon a
given subject suffer less, in consequence
of a distinct false charge, from a reputable source upon the very point where
they were before a little tender, than

would another whose reputation is entirely unquestioned in regard to it. Our
own observation would lead us to the
contrary conclusion; and, therefore, we
should say that the chief benefit derivable from evidenft of this character on
the part of the defendant must be sought
in its effect in rebutting malice. And
there can be no question it would be
most effectual in this way if accompanied
with probable proof of good faith and
sincerity on the part of defendant in
giving currency to the accusation, which
would be a very natuFal inference from
the general belief of the public upon
the point, unless there was evidence of
special evil intent on the part or the defendant. And it is unquestionable, that
the effect of this general evidence of
bad repute on the part of plaintiff,
would be more efficient in rebutting
all presumption of malice on the part of
the defendant, where it went to the very
act of which he was led to accuse the
plaintiff. And this is precisely the
class of evidence which the English
courts have generally held admissible :
Earl of Leicester vs. Walter, 2 Campb.
251;
vs. Moor, 1 M. & S. 284.1
The question is made in some of the
English cases whether the same rule of
evidence will apply where the defendant
pleads in justification the truth of the
words with the general issue. Snowdon
vs. Smith, in note to 1 M. & S. 286. So,
too, many of the American cases have
rejected general evidence of bad reputa-

1 If the question of damages in actions of slander were to turn mainly upon the
actual injury done to the plaintiff, it might be competent for the defendant to reduce the amount of the recovery, by showing his own bad reputation for truth,
and the good reputation of the plaintiff upon the subject of the accusation, whereby
it would naturally happen that the accusation would fail to gain any degree of
credit, and consequently to damage the plaintiff to any great extent. But it is
notorious that, in actions for defamation, the positive injury suffered by the plaintiff is one of the last and least of the ingredients which go to make up the damages
awarded.
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lion on the part of plaintiff, in consequence of defendant having plead in justification. Root vs. King, 7 Cow. R. 613;
Paddock vs. Salisbury, 2 Cow. R. 811.
But it is obvious that upon principle
there can be nothing in any such dictinetion. It goes upon the assumption that
such evidence will improperly prejudice
the finding of the jury upon the other
issue in the case. But such an objection
lies equally in all cases of jury trials
where there are different issues, which is
almost, of necessity, always the case. A
proper respect for and confidence in the
competency and impartiality of jurors to
discriminate in regard to the different
issues before them, and make the requisite application of the evidence to them,
would remove all objection upon this
ground. Hence, in the majority of the
best considered cases, this objection has
been regarded as having no foundation
in reason or principle. If the evidence
is competent to be received, upon any
issue, it remains competent so long as
that issue remains to be tried, whatever
other issues may also be for trial at the
same time. Stone vs. Varney, 7 Met. R.
86; Vick vs. Whitfield, 2 Hayw. 222;
Calloway vs. Middleton, supra; Sawyer
vs. Hopkins, 9 Shepley, 268; Henry vs.
Norwood, 4 Watts, 347 ; Lamos vs.
Snell, 6 N. H. B. 443; Bowen vs. Hall,
20 Vt. R. 232, and cases there cited by
Davis, J.
The only leading case which has called
the general doctrine of the admissibility
of such evidence in question, is that of
Jones vs. Stevens, 11 Price, 235-283.
This is, on many accounts, a remarkable
case.
1. The evidence was offered upon false
grounds, and was, ofcourse, rejected upon
false grounds, so that, while the reasoning
of the judges is all unbjectionable in the
main, the decision is altogether erroneous. The evidence was offered to con-

tradict the prefatory averments in the
declaration, that the plaintiff has always
sustained a good character, and also to
establish a general plea that he had been
guilty of dishonorable practices as an
attorney, without specifying the particular facts relied upon. The Court held,
very properly, that such a plea was bad,
and made a most wonderful flourish of
rhetoric in denunciation of such a mode
of pleading, which was all unnecessary,
since the decided cases sufficiently condemned it. J'Anson vs. Stuart, 1 T. R.
748; S. C. 2 Smith, L. C. 30, and cases
cjted in notes, both English and American.
2. The judges go out of their way
to argue the absurdity of receiving evidence upon the ground of contradicting
the mere inducements of the declaration,
without seeming to comprehend that
there were any other groundsupon which
it could be received.
3. To complete the climax of judicial
eccentricity, the Chief Baron rises in his
seat upon the bench, and, addressing
himself to the aged Baron, Wood, who
had just pronounced an opinion, more
wordy than wise, and far more rhetorical
than sound: "Upon the unimpaired
vigor of intellect, and unabated learning
which he had evinced in the discharge
of his high duties :" and expressed the
thanks of the Court "for the very effective and decisive part he had taken in
the determination of the important questions" involved.
And all this scenic exhibition is made
in an English court of law, upon occasion
of the decision of an inferior tribunal,
against all the former decision of coordinate courts, and all the analogies to
be derived from principle and reason-a
decision which has never been followed
to any extent, either in England or America. The case seems to have excited
very unusual interest at the time, and was
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argued by the most distinguished of the
English bar of that day-such men as
Brougham, Bayley, Jervis, and Taunton.
It was an action for libel upon an attorney in his professional capacity. The
case, for some reason, seems to have attracted a share of interest, both at the
bar and upon the bench, quite out of proportion to the importance of any legal
question involved, and, as is not uncommon in such cases, probably received a
wrong bias on that account, by which a
just result may have been reached in
the particular case, but quite at the expense of proper adherence to legal rules
and principles. The only English case
which we have noticed following this
lead is the N. P., one of Bracegirdle vs.
Bailey, I F. & F.1536, and we have no
belief that it will finally prevail in the
Court of last resorL
There are many analogies in the law
of libel and slander which lead us to conclude that the English rule first stated
is the true one.
Any evidence tending to show that
the plaintiff was liable to suspicion of
being guilty of the offence, short of a
full justification, may be given in evidence in mitigation of damages.
So, too, where the defendant only repeated what he heard from another, giving the name of the author at the time,
it may always be received to lessen
damages; and most of the cases hold it
a full justification of merely verbal slander, inasmuch as it adds nothing to the

force of the accusation to repeat it in
that mode, and when done in good faith
should involve no actionable responsibility. McPherson vs. Daniels, 10 B. &
Cr. 263. The resolutions in Lord Northampton's case, 12 Co. R. 134, are here
regarded as qualified in the important
particular, that to justify the repetition
of verbal slander invented by another, it
is requisite to allege and prove that defendant did it in good faith, believing
it to be true. Tindal, Ch. J., in Ward
vs. Weeks, 7 Bing. R. 211. See, also,
upon the questions discussed, Starkie on
Slander, 213, and cases cited by the
American editor; see, also, Tidman vs.
Ainslie, 28 Eng. L. & Eq. R. 567;
Woolmer vs. Latimer, 1 Jur. 119; Duncombe vs. Daniell, 2 Jur. 32.
In regard to the particular form of the
question involved in the principal case,
and the decision made by the court,
there is no reasonable ground of doubt
except upon the basis of the English
rule requiring proof of plaintiff being
guilty of the very offence. One might
feel surprise at the refinement of the
distinction attempted, in this case, by
the counsel, as indicated by the opinion
of the court, if there were not too much
ground to admit that such refinements
sometimes find favor with courts, so that
the duty of counsel to his client requires
him to urge every plausible argument in
favor of his cause, without much regard
to its probable fate with the Court.
I. F. R.

